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Abstract 
 
An elliptic curve-based signcryption scheme is 
introduced in this paper that effectively combines the 
functionalities of digital signature and encryption, and 
decreases the computational costs and communication 
overheads in comparison with the traditional signature-
then-encryption schemes. It simultaneously provides the 
attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, public 
verifiability, and forward secrecy of message 
confidentiality. Since it is based on elliptic curves and 
can use any fast and secure symmetric algorithm for 
encrypting messages, it has great advantages to be used 
for security establishments in store-and-forward 
applications and when dealing with resource-
constrained devices. 
 
Keywords: Public Key Cryptography, Digital 
Signature, Authentication, Non-repudiation, 
Computational Complexity, Public verifiability. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The encryption and digital signature are two 
fundamental cryptographic mechanisms that can 
provide the security of communications. Until the 
before decade, they have been viewed as important but 
distinct building blocks of various cryptographic 
systems. In the public key schemes, a traditional method 
is to digitally sign a message then followed by an 
encryption (signature-then-encryption) that can have 
two problems: Low efficiency and high cost of such 
summation, and the case that any arbitrary scheme 
cannot guarantee the security. The signcryption is a 
relatively new cryptographic technique that is supposed 
to fulfill the functionalities of digital signature and 
encryption in a single logical step. It effectively 
decreases the computational costs and communication 
overheads in comparison with the traditional signature-
then-encryption schemes. The first signcryption scheme 
was introduced by Zheng (1997) but it fails the forward 
secrecy of message confidentiality (Jung et al. 2001). 
Zheng also proposed an elliptic curve-based 
signcryption scheme that saves 58% of computational 
and 40% of communication costs when compared with 
the traditional elliptic curve-based signature-then-
encryption schemes (Zheng and Imai, 1998). Several 
signcryption schemes are also proposed over the years, 
each of them providing different level of security 
services and computational costs. The correctness, 
efficiency, and security are the essential attributes that 
any signcryption scheme should take them into account. 
A signcryption scheme should simultaneously fulfill the 
security attributes of an encryption and those of a 
digital signature. Such properties mainly include: 
Confidentiality, Unforgeability, Integrity, and Non-
repudiation. Some signcryption schemes provide 
further attributes such as Public verifiability and 
Forward secrecy of message confidentiality while the 
others do not provide them. The public verifiability may 
not be required in some applications while forward 
secrecy of message confidentiality has an increasingly 
significance especially when the signcryption is to be 
done on poorly protected devices such as mobile 
phones. For the case of brevity, we do not describe the 
mentioned attributes since they can be easily found in 
the corresponding literature such as (Tso et al., 2007). 
Currently, the elliptic curve cryptography is being used 
in a wide variety of applications. The elliptic curve-
based systems can attain to a desired security level with 
significantly smaller keys than those of required for 
their counterparts. This can enhance the speed and leads 
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to an efficient use of power, bandwidth, and storage that 
are the basic limitations of resource-constrained 
devices. The Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm 
Problem (ECDLP) (Hankerson et al., 2004) that can be 
a computationally infeasible problem has an essential 
role in the elliptic curve-based approaches. 
In this paper, a new elliptic curve-based signcryption 
scheme is introduced that simultaneously provides the 
attributes of message confidentiality, authentication, 
integrity, unforgeability, non-repudiation, public 
verifiability, and forward secrecy of message 
confidentiality. It is an authenticated scheme since it 
deploys an implicit authenticated key establishment. 
 
2. The Proposed Scheme 
 
Throughout this paper, Alice is the sender, Bob is the 
recipient, and Mallory is the malicious active attacker. 
Our proposed signcryption scheme is depicted in Figure 
1 where some of its deployed notations are described in 
Figure 2. It consists of four phases: Initialization, 
Signcryption, Unsigncryption, and Judge Verification. 
The initialization phase includes selecting the domain 
parameters, generating the private/public keys, and 
getting a certificate for the public key of each user. In 
signcryption phase, Alice signcrypts her message and 
sends it to Bob. In unsigncryption phase, Bob performs 
the unsigncryption to recover the signcrypted text and 
verify the signature. The judge verification phase is 
used only when any dispute occurs in which the judge 
decides whether Alice has sent the signcrypted message 
to Bob or not. 
 
 
Fig.1. The proposed signcryption scheme 
  
 
Fig.2. Explanation of deployed notations 
 
2.1. Initialization 
Domain parameters of the proposed scheme consist of a 
suitably selected elliptic curve E defined over a finite 
field qF  with the Weierstrass equation of the form 
baxxy  32 , and a base point )( qFEG  in which 
q is a large prime number. In order to make the elliptic 
curve non-singular, qFba ,  should satisfy 
)(mod0274 23 qba   (Hankerson et al., 2004). To 
guard against small subgroup attacks, the point G 
should be of a prime order n, or equivalently OnG  , 
and we should have qn 4  (Law et al., 2003). To 
protect against other known attacks on special classes of 
elliptic curves, n should not divide 1iq  for all 
Vi 1 ( 20V  suffices in practice), qn  should be 
satisfied, and the curve should be non-supersingular 
(Law et al., 2003). In order to keep the intractability of 
ECDLP to the Pollard-rho and Pohlig-Hellman 
algorithms (Stinson, 2006), n should at least satisfy 
1602n  for the common applications. NIST has also 
specified the minimum bit lengths of elliptic curves' 
domain parameters for different required level of 
security (NIST, 2007). 
The private keys of Alice and Bob are the randomly 
selected integers ]1,1[,  nww RBA . The 
corresponding public keys are calculated as GwW AA   
and GwW BB  . Alice and Bob are uniquely identified 
by the unique identifiers AID  and BID  respectively. 
They also get the certificates ACert  and BCert  from the 
Certificate Authority (CA) for their public keys AW  and 
BW . If CA is not involved in the public key generation 
that is generally the case, it is necessary for CA to verify 
that each entity really possesses the corresponding 
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private key of its claimed public key. This can be 
accomplished by a zero-knowledge proof. It should also 
be verified that the public keys belong to the main 
group. Hereafter, it is also assumed that the participants 
have access to an authentic copy of the CA's public key, 
in order to use it for the purpose of certificate 
validation. The process of certificate validation includes 
(Stinson, 2006): 
(a) Verifying the integrity and authenticity of the 
certificate by verifying the CA's signature on the 
certificate. 
(b) Verifying that the certificate is not expired. 
(c) Verifying that the certificate is not revoked. 
 
2.2. Signcryption 
Alice generates the signcrypted text ),,( sCR  by 
following the below steps: 
(1) Checks the validity of BCert  and uses it for 
verifying BW . 
(2) Randomly selects an integer ]1,1[  nr R . 
(3) Computes ),( RR yxrGR  . 
(4) Computes ),()~( KKBAR yxWwxrK   where 
    )2mod(2~ 2/2/ fRfR xx   in which 
  1log2  nf  is the bit length of n,  .  denotes 
the floor, and  .  indicates the ceiling. If OK   
she goes back to step 2. Otherwise, she drives the 
session key of encryption as 
)||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk   in which H generates 
the required number of bits as the secret key of 
deployed symmetric encryption. 
(5) Computes the ciphertext as )(MEC k . 
(6) Computes the digital signature as 
)(modnrtws A   in which 
)||||||||( BRARk IDyIDxMHMACt   where 
HMAC is the Hash Message Authentication Code. 
(7) Sends the signcrypted text ),,( sCR  to Bob. 
 
2.3. Unsigncryption 
Bob who received the signcrypted text ),,( sCR , 
follows the below steps to extract the plaintext and 
verify the signature: 
(1) Checks the validity of ACert  and uses it for 
verifying AW . 
(2) Computes ),()~( KKARB yxWxRwK   and 
derives the session key as 
)||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk  . 
(3) Decrypts the received ciphertext as )(CDM k . 
(4) Computes )||||||||( BRARk IDyIDxMHMACt  . 
(5) Verifies the Alice's signature by verifying 
AtWRsG  . If this condition is satisfied, Bob 
accepts M as the correct plaintext of Alice. 
Otherwise, he rejects M.  
In the security policies of certain applications, it may be 
specified that Bob upon verifying the signature of Alice, 
sends her a confirmation message M  in addition to a 
tag )(MMACt k   in which MAC is the Message 
Authentication Code. In such cases, Bob should also 
verify the validity of the received ),( RR yxR  , in 
order to thwart the invalid-curve attack (Hankerson et 
al., 2004). The point R acts as an ephemeral public key 
while r is the corresponding ephemeral private key. The 
validity verification of such ephemeral public key 
mainly includes checking the following conditions 
(Antipa et al., 2003):  
(a) OR  , 
(b) qRR Fyx , , 
(c) R should satisfy the defining equation of E. 
 
Here, the unsigncryption will be terminated with failure 
if any of the above-mentioned conditions fails. 
2.4. Judge Verification 
When Bob claims that he has received the signcrypted 
text ),,( sCR  from Alice and a dispute occurs, the 
trusted third party (judge) wants Bob to provide 
),,,,( kMsCR . Bob is simply capable of extracting M 
and k from the previously saved ),,( sCR . The judge 
follows the following steps to adjudicate on what Bob 
claims. 
(1) Checks the validity of ACert  and uses it for 
verifying AW . 
(2) Verifies )(CDM k . If this is not the case, Bob is 
wrong. 
(3) Computes )||||||||( BRARk IDyIDxMHMACt  . 
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(4) Verifies the signature of Alice by checking the 
AtWRsG   condition. If this condition is not 
satisfied, Bob is wrong. Otherwise, Alice has sent 
),,( sCR  to Bob. 
Several precautions should be taken into account in 
implementation of the proposed scheme. It is strongly 
recommended to use a strong block cipher (such as 
AES) for encrypting messages. The generated random 
numbers and also the state of pseudo-random generators 
should be erased from the memory as soon as the 
signature is generated. Using the predefined pairs of 
),( Rr  and saving them in an insecure storage media is 
not recommended. The private keys should be stored in 
a secure storage media such as a Hardware Security 
Module (HSM).  
Although it is not recommended, the first step of the 
signcryption and unsigncryption phases may be 
simplified after the first run of the protocol. Alice and 
Bob may save the trusted public key of the other party 
for the future uses. However, it is still necessary for Bob 
to check the revocation status of the Alice's certificate. 
The revocation status can be obtained using either of 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL), Delta CRL, or 
Online Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP). The OCSP 
(Myers et al. 1999) is the most profitable solution for 
the resource- constrained devices that cannot save a too 
large CRL, and whenever the timely information is 
necessary, e.g. in the funds transferring. The OCSP 
responses are digitally signed with a private key that its 
corresponding trusted public key is known to the 
participants. The OCSP server may query its required 
information from a database server. The certificates are 
usually stored in an LDAP (Lightweight Directory 
Access Protocol) directory (Zeilenga, 2006). Figure 3 
depicts a typical configuration for the proposed scheme 
when an OCSP server is queried for the revocation 
status, in which AOCSP  and BOCSP  are the 
corresponding OCSP tokens for the certificates of Alice 
and Bob. For the resource-constrained environments, 
delegating the validity verifications to a trusted server 
will improve the performance. The verification 
authority and hash chain can also be used for 
simplifying the certificate validations (Satizabál, 2007).  
 
Fig.3. A typical configuration for the proposed 
scheme 
The correctness of the proposed scheme can be simply 
verified. Alice and Bob will reach to the same point K 
on the elliptic curve since: 
),()~(
)~()~(
KKBARB
BARBARA
yxKWxRw
GwwxrWwxrK

       (1) 
Subsequently, both of participants calculate the same 
session key as )||||||( BKAK IDyIDxHk   so Bob 
correctly decrypts the signcrypted text and verifies the 
signature.  
Defining Rx~  as the least significant half in binary 
representation of Rx  is just a trade-off between security 
and efficiency. This corresponds with the NIST 
specifications (NIST, 2007). Let c denotes the bit length 
of Rx~ . The smaller the c the less required number of 
operations will be, and the efficiency will be 
subsequently improved. However, a too small c may 
decrease the security. For a similar case, Krawczyk has 
shown that choosing c so that fc 2  does not 
increase the security (Krawczyk, 2005). If L denotes a 
point of elliptic curve and   is a positive integer, 
finding L  takes )(log O  group operations 
(Wagstaff, 2003). As an example, the required number 
of operations for calculating ARWx~  is decreased by a 
factor of 2
)2log(
)2log(
)12log(
)12log( 22 

c
c
c
c
 with respect to that is 
required for calculating ARWx  when Rx~  is taken as the 
half in binary representation of Rx . Therefore, setting 
 2/fc   provides the best trade-off between security 
and efficiency. 
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Table 1. The provided attributes of different signcryption schemes 
Signcryption Schemes Confidentiality Integrity Unforgeability Non-repudiation Public Verifiability
Forward
Secrecy 
(Zheng, 1997) Yes Yes Yes By Supplementary Protocol No No 
(Jung et al., 2001) Yes Yes Yes By Supplementary Protocol No Yes 
(Zheng and Imai, 1998) Yes Yes Yes By Supplementary Protocol No No 
(Bao and Deng, 1998) Yes Yes Yes Directly Yes No 
(Gamage et al., 1999) Yes Yes Yes Directly Yes No 
(Han et al., 2004) No a No a No a Directly Yes No 
(Hwang et al., 2005) No b No b No b Directly Yes No 
Our Scheme Yes Yes Yes Directly Yes Yes 
a See (Toorani and Beheshti Shirazi, 2010) 
b See (Toorani and Beheshti Shirazi, 2008) 
3. On the Security of the Proposed Scheme 
The proposed scheme provides a wide variety of 
security attributes as it is depicted in Table 1. The long-
term private key of Alice is involved in the session key 
generation so the session key has resilience to 
disclosure of secret value r. Validity verification of the 
static and ephemeral public keys, and the certificates are 
carefully considered so several kinds of attacks are 
thwarted. The proposed scheme gets its security from 
several components: 
1) The security attributes of the session key 
establishment, 
2) The security attributes of the certificates, 
3) The security attributes of deployed block cipher, 
one-way hash function, and HMAC, 
4) Intractability of ECDLP due to the selected domain 
parameters. 
 
The proposed scheme deploys a strong key 
establishment. Until now, many authenticated key 
exchange protocols are introduced, each of them having 
their own problems and limitations. The MQV 
protocols (Law et al., 2003) are possibly the most 
efficient of all known authenticated Diffie-Hellman 
protocols that use public-key authentication. The MQV 
has been widely standardized, and has been selected by 
the NSA to protect the classified information of USA 
government. Although HMQV (Krawczyk, 2005) tries 
to thwart the MQV's vulnerabilities by basically 
introducing an additional hash function, it also has 
several vulnerabilities (Menezes, 2005. Menezes and 
Ustaoglu, 2006). The elliptic curve-based session key 
establishment process of the proposed scheme does not 
exactly correspond with that of (Law et al., 2003) and 
(Krawczyk, 2005), but it tries to improve and match 
such ideas for its own case. The session key 
establishment part of the proposed scheme has itself the 
following security attributes: 
1. Known session key security: Each execution of the 
protocol results in a unique session key. The session 
key will differ for different sessions because the 
ephemeral random number r is introduced in the 
session key establishment process so the compromise 
of one session key does not compromise the keys of 
the other sessions. Since the private keys and 
identifiers of both participants are involved in the 
session key derivation function, it will differ even if 
Alice uses the same random number r for 
signcrypting the same message for different 
recipients. 
 
2. Resilience to the Unknown-Key Share attack: In an 
UKS attack (Kaliski, 2001), two parties compute the 
same session key but have different views of their 
peers in the key exchange. This attack is feasible 
when a key exchange protocol fails to provide an 
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authenticated binding between the session key and 
identifiers of the honest entities. In the proposed 
scheme, validity of certificates and also the static and 
ephemeral public keys are verified. The UKS attack 
is thwarted because the identifiers of both Alice and 
Bob are explicitly involved in the session key 
derivation function. 
 
3. Resilience to the Key Compromise Impersonation 
(KCI) attack: In a KCI attack (Strangio, 2006), 
Mallory who could obtain the private key of Alice 
(but does not have the private key of Bob) tries to 
impersonate another honest party Bob to Alice. 
Resistance to the KCI attack is an important feature 
since as long as Mallory cannot actively control 
Alice, any session that is established by Alice 
remains secure. Under intractability of the ECDLP, 
the KCI attack is thwarted in the proposed scheme. 
An adversary that could obtain Aw , should find the 
corresponding r of R in order to deduce the 
corresponding session key that is generally in 
deposit of solving the ECDLP.  
 
4. Partial Forward secrecy: A system has the attribute 
of partial forward secrecy if compromising the long-
term private key of one entity (or more but not all the 
entities) does not compromise the previously 
established session keys. In the proposed scheme, 
even if Aw  is revealed, the attacker should have the 
value of the corresponding r that is generally in 
deposit of solving the ECDLP. 
 
As it is indicated in Table 1, the proposed scheme 
provides many attributes. Hereunder, a brief proof is 
given for the claimed attributes.  
 
1) Confidentiality: The proposed scheme deploys a 
strong block cipher so according to the Kerckhoffs' 
principle, the secrecy will be entirely resided in the 
established session keys. The session key establishment 
process has itself several security attributes. Ultimately, 
an adversary has only two ways to defeat the 
confidentiality: having Bw , or deriving both Aw  and r. 
Deriving the private keys and finding the corresponding 
r of a specific R is in deposit of solving the ECDLP that 
is computationally infeasible with the selected domain 
parameters. If Bw  is revealed, the attacker can only 
decrypt those ciphertexts that are signcrypted by BW . 
This is an inevitable feature of all the one-pass 
protocols with implicit authenticated key exchange. 
However, for a definite sender, the attacker should have 
both Aw  and the corresponding r of the clearly sent R. 
Otherwise, he cannot derive the true session key and the 
decryption will be computationally infeasible. It is 
noteworthy that the proposed scheme does not have the 
feature of past recovery so Alice cannot retrieve her 
previously signcrypted texts without having the 
corresponding r of R. Compromising the past recovery 
is a common feature of all the forward secure systems.  
 
2) Authentication: The implicit authentication is 
provided in three ways: the proposed scheme is 
certificate-based and the certificates are verified by both 
sender and recipient. An implicit authentication is also 
involved in the session key establishment so only the 
correct party who has the true private key can reach to 
the correct key agreement and perform the 
unsigncryption. An authentication is also accomplished 
when Bob verifies the signature by checking the 
AtWRsG   condition. 
 
3) Unforgeability: Mallory cannot forge the valid 
),,( sRM  with his malicious ),,( sRM  . A valid forged 
signature s' should satisfy sGtWGsWt AA   or 
equivalently Awttss )(   so the knowledge of t, t' 
and Aw  is necessary. To find the true value of 
)||||||||( BRARk IDyIDxMHMACt   and 
)||||||||( BRARk IDyIDxMHMACt  , Mallory should 
know the session key k that is in deposit of his 
knowledge of Bw , or both Aw  and r. Even if he knows 
Bw , he can only find the values of t and t' but his 
knowledge of Aw  is still necessary to forge the 
signature as Awttss )(  . Otherwise, he cannot 
truly forge the signature and his forged signature will be 
recognized in unsigncryption and judge verification 
phases when checking the AtWRsG   condition. 
 
4) Non-repudiation: This attribute can be deduced from 
the unforgeability. It is computationally infeasible to 
forge the Alice's signature without having Aw . The 
signature is verified through the certificate and public 
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keys validation and when checking the AtWRsG   
condition.  
 
5) Integrity: The hash value of message concatenated 
with some variable parameters is involved in the 
signature generation so any message alteration will 
change the signature. The integrity is guarantied by the 
security attributes of HMAC and unforgeability of the 
signature. Mallory should also have the valid session 
key to encrypt his modified message. Otherwise, his 
modified message will not be correctly decrypted by 
Bob. The session key is also involved in signature 
generation. He should have Bw , or both Aw  and r to 
find the valid session key. He should also find a 
collision for the HMAC that is computationally 
infeasible. Otherwise, he cannot forge a valid signature. 
The integrity is implicitly verified when Bob checks the 
AtWRsG   condition. 
 
6) Public verifiability: Given ),,,,( kMsCR  anybody 
can verify the signature by checking the AtWRsG   
condition, without any need for the private key of Alice 
or Bob. However, in some cases, it may be desirable to 
keep the message confidentiality so that any third party 
can verify the sender's signature without any need for 
knowledge of plaintext and the corresponding session 
key. This can be referred to as the directly public 
verifiability. If necessary, the proposed scheme can be 
modified so that the signature can be directly verified 
by anyone who observes the transmitted pairs of 
),,( sCR . Since directly public verification is not 
required in many applications, it will be introduced as 
an optional variant in Section 5. 
 
7) Forward secrecy of message confidentiality: It means 
that even if the long-term private key of the sender is 
revealed, the adversary is not capable of decrypting the 
previously signcrypted texts. The only way to defeat the 
message confidentiality is to have Bw , or both Aw  and 
r. When Aw  is revealed, for decryption to be possible, 
it is necessary to have the value of random number r for 
the corresponding session. Otherwise, the ephemeral 
session key cannot be recovered. Generally, the forward 
secrecy will be compromised only if the attacker can 
solve the ECDLP that is computationally infeasible with 
the selected domain parameters. As a one-pass protocol, 
since there is not any session-specific input from Bob, 
we cannot prospect the proposed scheme for the Perfect 
Forward Secrecy (PFS). However, the proposed scheme 
provides the partial forward secrecy under intractability 
of the ECDLP.  
 
4. Computational Costs 
In this section, the time complexity of the proposed 
scheme is evaluated. Table 2 gives a comparison 
between the computational costs of the proposed 
scheme and those of the other schemes, in which the 
computational costs of verifications and symmetric 
encryption are neglected. Since different schemes 
provide different number of security attributes, it is 
necessary to take a glimpse at the provided security 
attributes in Table 1 before comparing the 
computational costs of different schemes in Table 2. In 
Table 2, the computational costs are categorized with 
respect to different kinds of required operations, each of 
them requiring a different number of bit operations. The 
total running time of a signcryption scheme depends on 
the efficiency of deployed algorithm for each of 
required operations (hardware-independent), and the 
speed of deployed hardware (hardware-dependent). 
Let   1log2  n  denotes the bit-length of the 
modulus n. Since n is an odd prime number, the resulted 
calculations in the modular arithmetic have at most a 
bit-length of  . Adding and subtracting two ζ-bit 
integers each takes )(O  bit operations (Rosen, 1988) 
so we have: 
)(OTAdd      (2) 
Multiplying two ζ-bit integers, and dividing a 2ζ-bit 
dividend by a ζ-bit divisor takes )( 2O  bit operations 
using the conventional method (Rosen, 1988). Thus, 
)( 2OTMul      (3) 
)( 2OTDiv      (4) 
However, one can multiply and divide faster than what 
is specified by the conventional methods, e.g. a divide-
and-conquer algorithm due to Karatsuba and Ofman 
reduces the complexity of multiplication to )( 3log2O  
(Hankerson et al., 2004). There is also a fast algorithm 
for multiplying two ζ-bit integers in 
)logloglog( O  bit operations but it is not so useful 
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Table 2. Computational costs of different signcryption schemes 
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(Zheng, 1997) Alice 1 1 - - - 1 2 Bob 2 - - - 2 - 2 
(Jung et al., 2001) Alice 2 1 - - - 1 2 Bob 3 - - - 1 - 2 
(Bao and Deng, 1998) Alice 2 1 - - - 1 3 Bob 3 - - - 1 - 3 
(Gamage et al., 1999) Alice 2 1 - - - 1 2 Bob 3 - - - 1 - 2 
(Zheng and Imai, 1998) Alice - 1 1 - 1 1 2 Bob - - 2 1 2 - 2 
(Han et al., 2004) Alice - 1 2 - 2 1 2 Bob - 1 3 1 2 - 2 
(Hwang et al., 2005) Alice - - 2 - 1 1 1 Bob - - 3 1 - - 1 
Our Scheme Alice - - 2 - 2 2 2 Bob - - 4 2 - - 2 
unless   is very large (Wagstaff, 2003). However, for 
having a fair comparison between the computational 
costs of different schemes, it is reasonable to just 
consider what is required by the conventional methods 
since such results are the results of the worst situation 
and anyone can decrease the required number of bit 
operations by deploying faster algorithms. For the 
modular inverse calculation using the conventional 
method, we have (Rosen, 1988): 
)( 3OTInv      (5) 
The running time of the modular exponentiation using 
the conventional methods will be of (Rosen, 1988): 
)( 3OTExp      (6) 
The HMAC executes in approximately the same time as 
its embedded hash function for long messages but its 
running time depends on the kind of its embedded hash 
function. Total number of operations for the HMAC-
SHA1 calculations (Elkeelany et al., 2002) is as: 
)2(1110321 kSHAHMAC nT    (7) 
While for the case of HMAC-MD5, it is: 
)2(744325 kMDHMAC nT    (8) 
In which 
512
kNnk
  is the number of input blocks to 
the embedded hash function where N is the bit-length of 
the total message, and k is the bit-length of extra-
appended inner form of the key (Elkeelany et al., 2002). 
The computations in elliptic curves depend on 
many factors including the deployed coordinates. The 
computational cost of an Elliptic Curve Point Addition 
(ECPA) in an Affine coordinate is as: 
InvAddMulECPA TTTT
Affine
 63   (9) 
While for the Jacobian projective coordinate, we have: 
AddMulECPA TTT
Jacobian
716    (10) 
The Elliptic Curve Point Multiplication (ECPM) is a 
basic and time-consuming operation in ECC. The 
execution times of the EC-based schemes are typically 
dominated by the point multiplication. It typically takes 
)(log kO  group operations to compute kP when 0k  
(Wagstaff, 2003). Several methods for the scalar 
multiplication are proposed in the literature. However, 
selecting the suitable algorithm is complicated by 
platform characteristics, coordinate selection, memory 
and other constraints, security considerations, and 
interoperability requirements (Hankerson et al., 2004). 
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For elliptic curve P-192 defined over 
)122( 64192 pGF  that provides the same level of 
security as that of RSA with a 1024-bits modulus 
(NIST, 2000), the total required number of field 
operations for a point multiplication for an unknown 
point using the Window NAF method on Jacobian-
Chudnovsky coordinate is calculated in (Hankerson et 
al., 2004) as:  
InvMulECPM TTT 1936Chudnovsky-Jacobian   (11) 
However, for a fixed point P, using offline pre-
computations and Comb 2-table method in Jacobian-
Affine coordinate, it can be calculated as (Hankerson et 
al., 2004): 
InvMulECPM TTT  638Affine-Jacobian   (12) 
that is explicitly less than what is specified in (11). For 
other curves, coordinates and algorithms, the required 
number of operations will differ from what is specified 
in (11) and (12). The computational costs of the 
proposed scheme and those of the other schemes can be 
fairly compared using Table 2 and expressions (2-11). 
Figure 4 depicts the total required number of bit 
operations for executing signcryption and 
unsigncryption in the signcryption schemes that are 
described in Table 2, in which the computational costs 
of verifications and symmetric encryption are neglected. 
As it is apparent from Figure 4, the computational costs 
of our proposed scheme in unsigncryption phase is 
slightly more than the other depicted EC-based 
schemes, as it provides the most feasible security 
attributes, but it has a great computational advantage 
over its exponentiation-based counterparts. 
 
Fig. 4. Total number of bit operations for 
different signcryption schemes 
5. Optional Improvements 
In this section, some improvements are introduced to 
the proposed scheme. They are considered as optional 
improvements since they may not be required in some 
applications and systems. 
5.1. Delegating verifications to a trusted server 
When the participants are dealing with processing and 
memory constraints, delegating the validity verifications 
to a trusted server will offer significant advantages. The 
required time of sending a certificate to a validation 
server and subsequently, receiving and authenticating 
the response can be considerably less than the required 
time of performing the certificate path discovery and 
validation by a resource- constrained device. The 
performance of the proposed scheme can be greatly 
enhanced by delegating the validation processes to a 
Delegated Validation (DV) server, as it is depicted in 
Figure 5. The DV server can be independent of the 
communication network. It accomplishes the certificate 
validation via the Delegated Path Validation (DPV) 
protocol but its duties defers from what is specified in 
(Pinkas and Housley, 2002). All the signcrypted texts 
will be directed to the DV server through the 
communication network. The DV server accomplishes 
the certificate and public key validations for both sender 
and recipient. It queries the database server for the 
certificates of both sender and recipient through their 
identifiers. It obtains the revocation statuses by getting 
OCSP responses from the OCSP server. It also checks 
the validity of point R. The DV server will contact the 
designated recipient after a successful validation. If any 
error occurs, the DV server will send an error message 
to the initiator and saves a copy in its log file. 
According to the security policies, all the transmitted 
messages may be separately saved by the DV server for 
the possible disputes. The DV server digitally signs its 
responses, unless an error is occurred. The signed 
responses should include a hash value of all the 
transmitted parameters in addition to the identifiers of 
both sender and recipient.  
In the optimized configuration, Bob will not check the 
validity of point R because it is validated by the DV 
server. He just checks the DV server's signature. Alice 
does not need to check the revocation status of the 
Bob's certificate. She just needs to have the public key 
of Bob that can be simply queried from a database 
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server through the Bob's identifier when Alice does not 
have it. She can then save the public key of Bob for the 
future uses. 
 
 
Fig.5. An optimized configuration for the 
proposed scheme when it is used for the 
resource-constrained devices 
 
5.2. Using Timestamps 
Timestamps have an unavoidable role in many security 
applications when the true order of occurrence and 
freshness of messages are important. Alice can produce 
her timestamp AT  according to her local time or a 
predefined international time zone. It can be obtained 
from a trusted time server. The only required 
modifications to the proposed scheme are to modify the 
session key derivation function as 
)||||||||( ABKAK TIDyIDxHk  , and parameter t of 
signature generation function as 
)||||||||||( ABRARk TIDyIDxMHMACt  . Alice clearly 
includes her timestamp in her signcrypted text as 
),,,( sCRTA  and sends it to Bob. Bob upon receiving a 
new message, produces his timestamp BT  and checks 
whether  AB TT0  in which   is the acceptable 
time window that is determined by estimating the usual 
delay time between sending and receiving of a message 
in the deployed communication link. Hereby, Bob can 
easily neglect the old messages. This can simply thwart 
the potential replay attacks. Using timestamps, the 
deployed encryption and signature generation functions 
will be time-dependent and the freshness of messages 
will be enhanced. The timestamp can also be used as a 
parameter in the seed of random number generators. 
However, exploiting timestamps has its own problems 
(e.g. the synchronization) and cannot be deployed in 
some systems. 
5.3. Towards directly public verification 
In the proposed scheme, the signature can be verified by 
any third party provided that ),,,,( kMsCR  is provided 
by either of participants (Alice or Bob). However, in 
some cases, it may be desirable to keep the message 
confidentiality so that any third party can verify the 
sender's signature without any need to the knowledge of 
plaintext and the corresponding session key. If 
necessary, the proposed scheme can be modified so that 
the signature can be directly verified by anyone who 
observes the transmitted pairs of ),,( sCR  and without 
any for the private keys of the participants. This can be 
simply accomplished by modifying the parameter t in 
all phases of the proposed scheme as 
)||||||||( BRAR IDyIDxCHt  . Consequently, anyone 
who observes the transmitted ),,( sCR  can compute t 
and directly verify the Alice's signature by following the 
below steps:  
(1) Check the validity of ACert  and use it for verifying 
AW . 
(2) Verify the Alice's signature by checking the 
AtWRsG   condition.  
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, a new elliptic curve-based signcryption 
scheme is introduced that simultaneously provides the 
security attributes of message confidentiality, 
authentication, integrity, unforgeability, and non-
repudiation. It also has the attribute of public 
verifiability so any third party can verify the signature 
without any need for the private keys of the 
participants. It also has the attribute of forward secrecy 
of message confidentiality so even if the sender's 
private key is revealed, no one else can extract the 
plaintext of the previously signcrypted texts. Since it is 
based on elliptic curve cryptography and uses 
symmetric ciphering for encrypting messages, it has 
great advantages to be deployed in resource-constrained 
devices such as mobile phones. As a one-pass scheme, 
it is also so attractive for security establishment in store-
and-forward applications such as E-mail and Short 
Message Service. 
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